The flaw is in Kestra OSS AuthenticationFilter. The filter intended to exempt only public configuration endpoints from authentication, but it uses request.getPath().endsWith("/configs") instead of an exact path comparison. As a result, any API path whose final segment is configs can bypass Basic Auth, including routes for creating or overwriting flows, triggering executions, writing KV data, deleting flows, deleting dashboards, and deleting audit logs. The attacker controls resource identifiers in these paths and can therefore create a flow named configs and execute it without credentials. Script execution plugins such as plugin-script-shell and plugin-script-python are installed by default, so this chain can result in arbitrary command execution with UID 0 inside the Kestra worker container. The advisory also describes SSRF through Pebble's http() function when combined with the authentication bypass. Direct escape from the container to the Docker host was not confirmed; the advisory states that the worker container lacks CAP_SYS_ADMIN and does not mount /var/run/docker.sock.