The flaw is in the @nestjs/platform-fastify adapter, where Fastify routing and NestJS middleware application interpret the request URL differently. The attacker-controlled input is the HTTP request path, specifically a path variant that Fastify normalizes but NestJS's middleware matcher does not match. NestJS passes Fastify routerOptions, including ignoreTrailingSlash, ignoreDuplicateSlashes, and useSemicolonDelimiter, to the router, while middleware execution uses a separate regular-expression check over req.originalUrl. When that expression does not match, NestJS calls next() and skips the middleware, while Fastify may normalize the path and still dispatch the request to the protected handler. The vendor advisory identifies the relevant logic in packages/platform-fastify/adapters/fastify-adapter.ts, including the router-option handling and middleware checks. Exploitation requires an application using the Fastify adapter, non-default path-normalization options, and route-scoped middleware protecting a handler; the exact routes and middleware wiring remain application-specific.