Weak password hash in CareCam HMT.CM2507 Firmware can expose root credentials

CareCam CM2507 IP cameras store the device's root-account password using a fixed legacy password hash that provides insufficient resistance to offline cracking. An attacker who obtains the firmware image or password database could recover the associated credential, which may also be reusable across other devices running the same firmware.

• Product: CareCam HMT.CM2507 Firmware; default status is affected.
• Affected version: v251211.1507.
• No additional release branch or fixed release is confirmed by the available evidence.

The flaw is in the root-account credential storage mechanism of CareCam HMT.CM2507 Firmware and is classified as CWE-916, use of a password hash with insufficient computational effort. The password is stored using a fixed legacy hash, so an attacker who obtains the firmware image or password database could perform offline cracking to recover the associated credential. The possibility that the credential is reusable across other devices running the same firmware increases the potential exposure scope. The record does not identify the hash algorithm, whether a salt is used, the specific location of the password database, or how an attacker obtains those materials.

The supplied assessment characterizes exploitation as network reachable, with low attack complexity, no prior privileges required, and no user interaction. However, the technical description requires the attacker to first obtain a firmware image or password database for offline cracking; how that condition is achieved is not documented. If the recovered credential is accepted by an accessible management interface, it could provide a path to administrative access on the camera, but the relevant interface and service are not identified. The record does not confirm a public exploit. CISA stated that no known public exploitation specifically targeting the vulnerabilities in the advisory had been reported to it at that time; this does not guarantee that the devices have never been exploited.

The direct technical outcome is potential exposure of a credential with root privileges after offline cracking of the password hash. If the credential is accepted by an accessible management service, an attacker could potentially change device state or configuration, creating risks to camera confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Reuse of the credential across devices running the same firmware could increase the impact scope laterally. Actual impact depends on the attacker's ability to obtain the firmware image or password database and on the specific authentication interface, which are not disclosed.

Recovery of the root credential could enable unauthorized administrative access if the credential is accepted by a camera management interface. Possible consequences include configuration changes, disruption of video recording or streaming, and loss of operational control, but the record does not confirm a particular interface or attack scenario. If the same credential is used on multiple devices running the same firmware, one exposed credential could expand the remediation scope from one camera to a device group. The record provides no evidence that an intrusion or data loss has actually occurred.

1. Minimize network exposure for the cameras and ensure that they are not directly accessible from the internet, consistent with CISA's recommended practice for control-system devices.
2. Contact CareCam for updated firmware information or a product-specific mitigation. The advisory states that CareCam had not responded to CISA's coordination attempts, and no fixed release is identified in the available evidence.
3. Until confirmed vendor guidance is available, review all accessible firmware images and password databases, and assess whether the root credential is reused across cameras running the same firmware.
4. Do not treat another version as safe merely because it is not listed in the advisory. Confirm affected-branch coverage and fix status with CareCam.

1. Inventory CareCam CM2507 cameras and verify the firmware in use, matching the exact affected version listed in the affected scope.
2. Identify where the device firmware image and password database are stored, who can read them, and whether copies exist in backups, internal repositories, or firmware distribution systems.
3. Check whether the root credential is reused across multiple cameras running the same firmware. If it is, treat the entire related device group as one remediation scope.
4. Review root login activity, configuration changes, and administrative actions as precautionary monitoring. These are defensive checks, not confirmed indicators for this vulnerability.
5. Do not treat the absence of suspicious logs as proof that a device is safe, because the record provides no specific log event or indicator.