The flaw is in Socialite's Facebook provider, specifically getUserByOIDCToken() in FacebookProvider.php. Before the fix, the provider checked the token signature and the aud and iss claims but did not compare the token's nonce with a session or request-bound expected nonce. An attacker who obtains a valid, unexpired id_token issued for the same Facebook App ID can therefore replay it through the backend userFromToken() flow. The key precondition is possession of that valid token; the record states that no prior attacker privileges or user interaction are required, while the token-acquisition requirement makes the attack high complexity. The patch adds a nonce parameter to userFromToken(), stores the expected nonce, obtains it through getExpectedNonce(), and rejects a missing or mismatched nonce using hash_equals. How a token is captured or obtained, and how the application maps the Socialite identity to account permissions, remain deployment-dependent.