envoyproxy Envoy: HTTP/2 header accounting flaw causes memory exhaustion

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What is CVE-2026-73550?

CVE-2026-73550 is a vulnerability classified as Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime, affecting envoy (affected versions: < 1.36.10, >= 1.37.0, < 1.37.6, and other affected versions). This vulnerability is rated High, with a CVSS score of 7.5. Public exploit code or evidence is available for this vulnerability, but that does not confirm exploitation in the wild.

Overview

Original source data

Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1, Envoy copies every decoded HTTP/2 Host header value before discarding it when:authority is already present. The discarded value bypasses saveHeader, so its bytes and count are not charged against request header limits. An unauthenticated client can use HPACK indexing to submit many references to a large Host value across a bounded number of streams, forcing extreme header-copy allocation and causing the proxy to be out-of-memory killed. The relevant scope boundary is that the demonstrated amplification uses HTTP/2 HPACK and the duplicate Host discard behavior. This issue is fixed in versions 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1.

Affected products and scope

The CVE record provides these specific affected branches:

  • envoyproxy Envoy < 1.36.10.
  • envoyproxy Envoy >= 1.37.0, < 1.37.6.
  • envoyproxy Envoy >= 1.38.0, < 1.38.4.
  • envoyproxy Envoy >= 1.39.0, < 1.39.1.

The corresponding confirmed fixes are 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1. The GitHub advisory uses a broader affected label of < 1.40.0, but that label does not by itself establish the status of every parallel branch. Use the branch-specific ranges above for inventory and treat releases outside them as requiring confirmation.

Technical details

envoyproxy Envoy copies every decoded HTTP/2 header value before passing it to the HTTP/2 codec callback. When :authority is already present, an ordinary Host header is discarded in ServerConnectionImpl::onHeader before it reaches saveHeader. Because request header size and count limits are enforced only in saveHeader, the discarded value is not charged against those limits even though its copy has already been created. HPACK indexing lets a relatively small header block repeatedly reference a large Host value across a bounded number of streams, producing extreme memory allocation and copy pressure. When process memory is exhausted, the proxy can be OOM-killed and restarted by its supervisor. The demonstrated scope is the HTTP/2 HPACK path combined with duplicate Host discard behavior; the record does not establish the same mechanism for other protocols.

Exploitability

  • Reachability: The attack is performed over the network against an Envoy HTTP/2 listener using ordinary HTTPS HTTP/2 traffic.
  • Authentication and interaction: The client does not need authentication, control-plane or admin access, local access, or user interaction.
  • Technical preconditions: The HTTP/2 path must encounter :authority together with a Host header that is discarded, and the attacker must be able to use HPACK indexing to repeat a large value.
  • Exploitation status: The record states that a public exploit exists, and the vendor advisory includes a proof of concept that causes an OOM kill and process restart. Exploitation in production environments is not established by the supplied evidence.

Technical impact

The technical outcome is repeated allocation of discarded Host header values without charging them to request-header limits, resulting in memory exhaustion and possible process termination. The attack is remote, unauthenticated, and requires no user interaction, so an HTTP/2 listener reachable from an untrusted network is the priority exposure to review. Likely organisational consequences include proxy restarts, traffic interruption, and reduced routing or backend-protection capacity while the instance recovers. The record provides no evidence that the flaw directly causes confidentiality or integrity loss. The demonstrated scope is limited to HTTP/2 HPACK processing and duplicate Host discard behavior.

Business impact

A suitably constructed HTTP/2 request can cause the Envoy process to be OOM-killed and restarted. For an edge proxy or service-mesh data plane, this can interrupt requests handled by the affected instance, reduce service capacity, or cause local availability loss for dependent backends during recovery. The vendor advisory states that the attack does not require control-plane access, admin access, local access, malicious upstream behavior, or non-stable extensions. The available evidence establishes an availability impact, but does not establish data disclosure or data modification.

Remediation

  1. Upgrade Envoy according to the deployed branch: branch 1.36 to 1.36.10, branch 1.37 to 1.37.6, branch 1.38 to 1.38.4, or branch 1.39 to 1.39.1.
  2. Verify that the actual binary or image contains the fix and complete the rollout across all edge proxies, service-mesh data planes, and instances accepting HTTP/2.
  3. The fix counts the size and number of discarded Host headers toward request-header limits and updates decompressed-header byte accounting. Do not disable the runtime guard envoy.reloadable_features.http2_track_size_of_dropped_host_header, because the vendor notes that setting it to false reverts the protective behavior.
  4. If an upgrade cannot be completed, the supplied record and reviewed advisory do not document a complete confirmed workaround. Reducing exposure of untrusted HTTP/2 listeners may be considered a risk-reduction measure, but it is not a substitute for the fix.

Detection

  1. Inventory running Envoy binaries, container images, and packages, then compare them with the affected release branches.
  2. Identify Envoy listeners that accept HTTP/2 from untrusted clients, especially edge proxies and service-mesh data planes.
  3. Review protocol telemetry or request logging for HTTP/2 requests containing both :authority and Host. This pattern matches the vulnerable condition but does not by itself prove exploitation.
  4. Review container or process-supervisor events for OOM kills, Envoy restarts, OOMKilled=true, or exit status 137. These symptoms are consistent with the issue but are not unique indicators.
  5. Correlate abnormal restarts with rising memory use and HTTP/2 traffic containing large or repeated headers. This is precautionary monitoring, not a confirmed indicator specific to the vulnerability.
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