Zscaler MCP Server allows HMAC confirmation token replay across resources

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What is CVE-2026-59563?

CVE-2026-59563 is a vulnerability classified as Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness, affecting zscaler-mcp-server (affected versions: 0.7.0 – < 0.7.2). This vulnerability is rated Medium, with a CVSS score of 4.6. Current sources do not report this vulnerability as exploited.

Overview

Original source data

Zscaler MCP Server versions 0.7.0 and 0.7.1 has an issue where HMAC confirmation tokens were not bound to the target resource identifier, allowing an MCP client or agent to replay a token generated for one resource to affect another resource of the same type. This issue is fixed in version 0.7.2.

Affected products and scope

  • Zscaler MCP Server: affected versions are 0.7.0 and 0.7.1. The structured affected range is 0.7.0 with lessThan: 0.7.2, using custom versioning, and the default status is unaffected outside the supplied affected declaration.
  • Fixed release: 0.7.2, confirmed by the CNA description and the merged project change and release note.
  • The evidence does not establish the status of later or parallel release branches beyond this fixed-release statement.

Technical details

The vulnerable logic creates or verifies HMAC confirmation tokens without binding the authenticated token data to the target resource identifier. As a result, a token generated for one resource can be reused against another resource of the same type. The corrective pull request states that 31 delete operations across ZPA, ZIA, and ZTW passed empty parameters to check_confirmation(), while the fix adds each specific resource identifier to the HMAC payload and adds regression coverage. The supplied attack characteristics indicate network reachability, low privileges, and required user interaction. The record does not establish token lifetime, exact resource classes beyond those named in the change, or whether other operations share the same condition.

Exploitability

  • The supplied attack characteristics indicate network reachability, low complexity, low privileges, and required user interaction.
  • The attacker model is an MCP client or agent able to obtain a confirmation token for one resource and replay it against another resource of the same type.
  • The record marks public_exploit as false and supplies no known_exploited status. Supplemental record data marks exploitation as none and automation as no, but this is not proof that exploitation has never occurred outside the available reporting.
  • No named exploit, campaign, victim, or specific indicator is provided.

Technical impact

The primary technical outcome is cross-resource authorization confusion: a valid confirmation for resource A may be accepted for resource B of the same type. This can undermine the integrity of resource-management actions and may reduce availability when the action deletes or changes a resource; the exact effect depends on the operation invoked. The supplied vector indicates unchanged scope and no identified confidentiality effect. Exploitation still requires the stated privileges and user interaction, so this is not described as an unauthenticated, fully autonomous path.

Business impact

An accepted replay could apply a confirmation intended for one resource to another, creating a risk of wrong-target administrative action. Because the corrective change covers delete operations, successful exploitation could delete or change the state of the wrong same-type resource, causing service disruption and recovery work. The available evidence does not identify a confidentiality impact, so unauthorized data disclosure is not established. Deployments using the affected confirmation flow and reachable MCP clients or agents should receive priority review.

Remediation

  1. Upgrade Zscaler MCP Server to 0.7.2, the confirmed fixed release. Do not infer that later or parallel branches are covered unless the vendor confirms them.
  2. If the upgrade cannot be completed immediately, treat deployments in the affected range as exposed and, as a precaution rather than a confirmed workaround, restrict network reachability to trusted MCP clients and minimize their privileges. The record supplies no vendor workaround.
  3. Review resource-management actions performed while an affected deployment was active, prioritizing the ZPA, ZIA, and ZTW delete paths identified in the corrective change.

Detection

  1. Inventory all Zscaler MCP Server deployments, record their installed release, and compare it with the affected and fixed boundaries in this entry.
  2. Identify whether each deployment uses the HMAC confirmation flow for ZPA, ZIA, or ZTW resource-management operations, especially the delete operations named in the corrective change.
  3. Where audit data records both confirmation-token use and target-resource identity, look for a token or confirmation event reused with a different same-type resource. This is a defensive review pattern, not a supplied IOC.
  4. Review successful and failed resource-management actions from affected deployments for unexpected target changes or deletions, and correlate them with the requesting MCP client or agent.
  5. No specific log event, token lifetime, or vendor-defined IOC is provided, and absence of such evidence does not prove that the deployment was not exposed.
Sources (12)
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