decolua 9Router Login Lockout Bypass Enables Unthrottled Password Guessing

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What is CVE-2026-56682?

CVE-2026-56682 is a vulnerability classified as Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts and Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision, affecting 9router (affected versions: < 0.5.6). This vulnerability is rated Medium, with a CVSS score of 5.3. Public exploit code or evidence is available for this vulnerability, but that does not confirm exploitation in the wild.

Overview

Original source data

9Router is an AI router & token saver. Prior to 0.5.6, 9Router deployments that allow requests to reach Next.js without the sanitizing custom-server.js wrapper use the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip value as the bucket key in getClientIp, checkLock, and recordFail in src/lib/auth/loginLimiter.js for POST /api/auth/login. A remote unauthenticated attacker can rotate the header on every password guess so each request uses a new failed-attempt bucket and the five-attempt progressive lockout never returns HTTP 429. This permits unthrottled password guessing against the dashboard login and can lead to an administrative session if the password is recovered. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.6.

Affected products and scope

  • decolua 9router: the normalized record identifies versions < 0.5.6 as affected.
  • The vendor advisory specifically lists version 0.5.4 as affected. Its rendered patched-version field shows 5.6, which is inconsistent with the normalized record and the repository release tag v0.5.6.
  • 0.5.6 is the confirmed fixed version from the normalized record and repository release. The status of parallel branches or versions not covered by these facts is not established.

Technical details

decolua 9Router uses src/lib/auth/loginLimiter.js to limit failed login attempts by a bucket derived from the client IP. When requests reach Next.js directly without the sanitizing custom-server.js wrapper, getClientIp() takes the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip value directly, and checkLock() and recordFail() use that value as the bucket key. A remote unauthenticated attacker can submit POST /api/auth/login requests with a different header value for each password guess, causing every attempt to enter a new bucket and preventing the lock threshold from being reached. The vendor advisory reports that a fixed header value triggers 429, while rotating the header produces 401 responses without lockout. The key deployment precondition is that requests can reach Next.js without the trusted wrapper; the record does not establish that every reverse-proxy configuration or deployment path is affected.

Exploitability

  • The issue is remotely reachable over the network through POST /api/auth/login.
  • No prior authentication or user interaction is required.
  • The deployment must expose the dashboard login and allow requests to reach Next.js without the sanitization performed by custom-server.js.
  • Exploitation is straightforward because the attacker can change X-9r-Real-Ip between attempts to create separate limiter buckets.
  • The decolua advisory publicly documents a reproduction of the bypass. The record does not establish whether the weakness has been exploited in the wild.

Technical impact

  • The flaw defeats IP-based authentication-attempt restriction, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to continue password guessing without the intended progressive lockout.
  • If the password is guessed, the result may be an authenticated dashboard session with administrative privileges and access to protected APIs.
  • The record establishes an increased likelihood of account compromise through password guessing, but does not establish direct data modification, denial of service, or pre-authentication administrative access.
  • Actual exposure depends on whether the login endpoint is reachable and whether the deployment bypasses the custom-server.js sanitization layer.

Business impact

  • The dashboard's brute-force and credential-stuffing protection can be neutralized, substantially increasing the number of password guesses a remote source can make.
  • If the dashboard password is recovered, the attacker may obtain an administrative session and access the 9Router dashboard and its protected APIs.
  • The vulnerability does not itself provide the password and is not described as directly bypassing password verification; the consequence depends on recovering valid authentication data.
  • Deployments that expose the dashboard externally or permit direct access to Next.js have greater exposure to the described attack condition.

Remediation

  1. Upgrade decolua 9router to 0.5.6. This is the fixed version confirmed by the normalized record and repository release tag. Do not infer the status of other branches without checking them separately.
  2. Ensure that the rate-limit key is derived from the transport-level peer address, such as req.socket.remoteAddress, rather than from a client-controlled header.
  3. Trust forwarded client-IP headers only when the request comes through explicitly configured, trusted proxy infrastructure. At the network edge, remove or reject client-supplied X-9r-* headers before they reach the limiter.
  4. If the deployment depends on custom-server.js, fail closed when the trusted wrapper or marker is absent instead of allowing requests to reach Next.js with unsanitized headers.
  5. Consider a global attempt ceiling and progressive backoff so that changing the bucket key cannot reset all authentication counters. If a deployment may have been exposed, reset dashboard credentials and review administrative sessions as a precaution.

Detection

  1. Inventory decolua 9Router deployments and compare installed versions with the affected boundary in affected_summary.
  2. Determine whether dashboard requests pass through custom-server.js or reach Next.js directly. Check whether the reverse proxy removes or rejects client-supplied X-9r-* headers.
  3. Review application or proxy logs for repeated failed POST /api/auth/login requests with continuously changing X-9r-Real-Ip values, especially when many 401 responses occur without the expected 429 response. This pattern is consistent with the bypass but does not by itself prove account compromise.
  4. As a precaution, review successful dashboard logins and administrative sessions created after unusual bursts of failed password attempts.
  5. Do not treat the absence of this pattern in available logs as proof of safety, because the record does not establish each deployment's logging coverage, retention, or observability.
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