VeraCrypt wolfCrypt Builds Bypass PBKDF2 Work Factors, Enabling Cheaper Offline Password Guessing

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What is CVE-2026-53762?

CVE-2026-53762 is a vulnerability classified as Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort, affecting VeraCrypt (affected versions: < 1.26.29). This vulnerability is rated Medium, with a CVSS score of 6.2. Public exploit code or evidence is available for this vulnerability, but that does not confirm exploitation in the wild.

Overview

Original source data

VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. Prior to 1.26.29, non-default builds created with WOLFCRYPT=1 and WOLFCRYPT_BACKEND route SHA-256 and SHA-512 volume-header key derivation through derive_key_sha256 and derive_key_sha512 in src/Crypto/wolfCrypt.c, where the configured iterations value is discarded and wc_HKDF is used instead of PBKDF2-HMAC. Changing the PIM or iteration count therefore does not increase derivation cost, allowing an attacker with an affected container, disk image, or volume header to perform substantially cheaper offline password guesses. Official precompiled VeraCrypt binaries and normal distribution packages use the standard PBKDF2 backend and are not affected. Volumes created by an affected WOLFCRYPT=1 build require backup and recreation because corrected builds derive different keys. This issue is fixed in version 1.26.29.

Affected products and scope

  • Custom VeraCrypt builds: Affected in the < 1.26.29 branch when built with the opt-in WOLFCRYPT=1 path and using WOLFCRYPT_BACKEND; the affected functionality is SHA-256/SHA-512 volume-header key derivation.
  • Official precompiled binaries and normal distribution packages: Not affected according to the vendor advisory because they use the standard PBKDF2 backend.
  • Fixed boundary: The vendor identifies 1.26.29 as the patched version for the affected build path. The record does not establish the status of every other custom build configuration or parallel release branch.

Technical details

Vulnerable non-default builds enable WOLFCRYPT_BACKEND when built with WOLFCRYPT=1. In that path, src/Volume/Pkcs5Kdf.cpp passes the configured iteration count to derive_key_sha256() and derive_key_sha512() in src/Crypto/wolfCrypt.c, but the backend discards it and calls wc_HKDF() rather than a PBKDF2-HMAC implementation. HKDF does not provide VeraCrypt's iteration loop, so changing PIM or the iteration count does not increase SHA-256/SHA-512 volume-header derivation cost. An attacker who obtains an affected container, disk image, or volume header can therefore test password guesses offline at a substantially lower computational cost than intended. The supported affected scope is limited to the opt-in wolfCrypt build path; official precompiled binaries and ordinary distribution packages use the standard PBKDF2 backend. The advisory's implementation detail establishes the incorrect KDF selection and ignored parameter, but it does not establish that every custom build using other backend combinations is affected.

Exploitability

  • Reachability: Local and offline. The attacker needs an affected container, disk image, or volume header; no network service is described.
  • Privileges and interaction: The record characterizes the scenario as requiring no privileges and no user interaction once the artifact is available.
  • Complexity: The record characterizes attack complexity as low because guesses can be tested without VeraCrypt's intended PBKDF2/PIM cost.
  • Public detail: The vendor advisory includes a proof of concept showing that vulnerable derivation output is unchanged when the iteration input changes, while corrected derivation responds to that input. The available evidence does not establish whether the issue has been used in the wild.

Technical impact

The primary technical outcome is loss of the intended password-guessing resistance for volume headers, which can increase the chance of recovering volume contents when passwords are guessable. If the password is recovered, confidentiality of the corresponding volume may be lost; the described flaw does not provide a direct mechanism for modifying data or causing denial of service. The attacker must first obtain an affected artifact, and success still depends on password quality and the ability to validate guesses. Binaries and packages using the standard PBKDF2 backend are outside the documented affected scope.

Business impact

  • Confidentiality exposure: Lower offline password-guessing cost can increase the chance of recovering volume contents when passwords are weak, guessable, or exposed elsewhere.
  • Reduced protection from configured settings: PIM and iteration settings may not provide the expected increase in computational cost for the affected build path.
  • Operational disruption: Remediation is not limited to replacing the binary. Data in volumes created by an affected wolfCrypt build must be backed up and recreated to work with the corrected derivation behavior.
  • Scope limit: The vendor advisory identifies official precompiled VeraCrypt binaries and normal distribution packages as unaffected. Organizations still need to verify artifact provenance rather than infer safety from the product name alone.

Remediation

  1. Upgrade the custom build to 1.26.29. This release changes the WOLFCRYPT=1 path to wolfCrypt PBKDF2 and honors VeraCrypt's PBKDF2 iteration count.
  2. Inventory build provenance before deployment. Identify artifacts built with WOLFCRYPT=1 and WOLFCRYPT_BACKEND instead of assuming that all VeraCrypt binaries use the same backend.
  3. Back up data before migration. Prioritize volumes created by affected wolfCrypt builds.
  4. Recreate affected SHA-256/SHA-512 volumes. Corrected builds derive PBKDF2 keys differently from the earlier HKDF behavior, so old volumes may not mount after migration to a corrected build.
  5. If rebuilding or recreating immediately is not possible, treat those volumes as having a lower-than-intended offline password-guessing work factor and prioritize controlled migration of volumes containing sensitive data. This is a mitigation, not a fix.

Detection

  1. Inventory all VeraCrypt deployments, distinguishing official precompiled or distribution-package artifacts from locally built artifacts.
  2. For source-built artifacts, inspect build records, CI definitions, or package metadata for WOLFCRYPT=1 and WOLFCRYPT_BACKEND.
  3. Identify containers, disk images, and volume headers created by those builds, and determine whether their header KDF uses SHA-256 or SHA-512.
  4. In a controlled test environment, verify whether changing the supplied PBKDF2 iteration input changes the derived output for the custom build. The advisory states that vulnerable code produces the same output for different iteration counts, while corrected code uses wc_PBKDF2() and the supplied count.
  5. No product-specific runtime IOC or log event is established in the available evidence. Generic monitoring of unusual offline access to volume files is only a precaution, not a known indicator.
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