PX4-Autopilot tattu_can stack overflow enables CAN-triggered crashes and memory corruption

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What is CVE-2026-32707?

CVE-2026-32707 is a vulnerability classified as Stack-based Buffer Overflow, affecting PX4-Autopilot (affected versions: < 1.17.0-rc2). This vulnerability is rated Medium, with a CVSS score of 6.1. Public exploit code or evidence is available for this vulnerability, but that does not confirm exploitation in the wild.

Overview

Original source data

PX4 autopilot is a flight control solution for drones. Prior to 1.17.0-rc2, tattu_can contains an unbounded memcpy in its multi-frame assembly loop, allowing stack memory overwrite when crafted CAN frames are processed. In deployments where tattu_can is enabled and running, a CAN-injection-capable attacker can trigger a crash (DoS) and memory corruption. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.17.0-rc2.

Affected products and scope

  • PX4 PX4-Autopilot: versions < 1.17.0-rc2 are affected; the developer advisory expresses this scope as <= 1.17.0-rc1.
  • Practical exposure is limited to deployments where tattu_can is compiled and running. The advisory states that this is typically vendor-specific or custom firmware and is not commonly enabled in default upstream builds.
  • Confirmed fixed release: 1.17.0-rc2. The available evidence does not provide a branch-by-branch statement for later or parallel release branches beyond this named fix.

Technical details

The vulnerable component is tattu_can; the developer advisory identifies src/drivers/tattu_can/TattuCan.cpp, in assembly logic around line 114. offset starts at 5, and for each subsequent frame payload_size is derived from received_frame.payload_size - 1; the code copies payload_size bytes into tattu_message without checking offset + payload_size <= sizeof(Tattu12SBatteryMessage). Repeated crafted frames can therefore overwrite the stack object, matching CWE-121. The attack requires tattu_can to be compiled into the firmware and running, plus an attacker able to inject CAN frames; this is physical or CAN-bus reachability rather than a general network path. The evidence supports a crash and memory corruption, but does not establish reliable code execution, privilege escalation, data disclosure, or a specific post-corruption control-flow outcome.

Exploitability

Exploitation requires physical access, or equivalent ability, to inject CAN frames into the vehicle bus; the issue is not described as an Internet-reachable attack. Once CAN injection is available, the record indicates that authentication and user interaction are not required, and exploitation complexity is low. The developer advisory documents an integrated proof-of-concept or reproduction, and the record marks public exploit material as available. This establishes public exploitability, not exploitation in the wild; current in-the-wild status is not established. The advisory does not establish reliable code execution or a repeatable outcome beyond a crash and memory corruption.

Technical impact

The immediate technical result is a stack memory overwrite in the PX4 process, with confirmed crash and memory-corruption outcomes. Availability of the flight-control process can be lost when it crashes, while the integrity of in-process state can be affected. The evidence does not establish data disclosure, reliable code execution, privilege escalation, or impact beyond the affected component. Because the attacker needs physical CAN-injection capability and the impact scope is unchanged, exposure depends heavily on vehicle wiring, bus access, and deployment configuration. Organisational consequences may include interrupted missions, recovery or maintenance work, and a safety review; no specific physical incident is established.

Business impact

The flaw can crash the flight-control process, interrupting flight operations and potentially requiring a restart, recovery, or vehicle inspection. The stack overwrite can also corrupt in-memory control state or processing data, although the exact downstream behavior is not established. Active missions may be interrupted, and affected vehicles may need to be removed from service while the firmware and CAN environment are investigated. Physical safety consequences are possible depending on the vehicle design, failsafe behavior, and flight state, but the evidence does not identify a specific incident or victim.

Remediation

  1. Upgrade PX4-Autopilot to the confirmed fixed release 1.17.0-rc2, then redeploy the firmware and verify the version actually installed on each vehicle.
  2. While waiting for the upgrade, identify builds containing CONFIG_DRIVERS_TATTU_CAN=y and systems running tattu_can. If operational safety procedures permit, stop or remove the driver from exposed firmware as temporary containment; this follows from the advisory's operational precondition and does not replace patching.
  3. Restrict physical access and access to the CAN bus for systems that cannot yet be patched. This reduces the opportunity for frame injection but does not remove the firmware defect.
  4. After upgrading, recheck the build artifact and runtime state to ensure that an older image or a configuration with the vulnerable component has not remained deployed.

Detection

  1. Inventory PX4-Autopilot firmware and identify the version deployed on each vehicle or device.
  2. Inspect build artifacts for CONFIG_DRIVERS_TATTU_CAN=y, then verify the driver's runtime state, including whether tattu_can has been started.
  3. Review flight-controller crash, restart, or reset logs together with CAN-bus telemetry around malformed or unusual multi-frame processing.
  4. If a crash or reset occurs without a confirmed cause, preserve the firmware image, logs, and CAN data for analysis before restarting the system.
  5. Treat the absence of a visible crash as insufficient evidence of safety; the public evidence does not provide a product-specific IOC that can rule out exposure.
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