Hard-coded Platform Keys in Acer, Aopen, and Dell UEFI firmware enable Secure Boot bypass

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What is CVE-2024-8105?

CVE-2024-8105 is a vulnerability classified as Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key, affecting vz2694g (affected versions: d61d0e09d008bfb29bc32532b1b94fcc4ee2af5e8372c6d38722a4e73ecc71d6 – < 0), aspire s 27 (affected versions: 2bd2bfaf79a72eaca45e544e5c6a5bb842b292bdc229b8975b3101a4013e0d5f), aspire s32-1856 (affected versions: 29837e239487cc83818a7f40f9280d9692a50376487899edd603494b0f30e4c5), and 197 more products. This vulnerability is rated Medium, with a CVSS score of 6.4. Public exploit code or evidence is available for this vulnerability, but that does not confirm exploitation in the wild.

Overview

Original source data

A vulnerability exists in UEFI implementations that use a hard-coded software-based Platform Key (PK). An attacker in possession of the corresponding PK private key can sign arbitrary UEFI executables or firmware components, causing them to be trusted by affected systems and potentially bypassing UEFI Secure Boot trust validation.

Affected products and scope

The normalized record marks specific firmware artifacts as affected for the following models. These entries use versionType: sha256sum; the complete hash values are not reproduced here. Each entry has default_status set to unaffected, so the record does not establish that unlisted firmware is affected.

  • Acer: vz2694g, aspire s 27, aspire s32-1856, aspire xc-1710, c24-1655, aspire c22-1600, c24-962, altos r680 f4, and altos r680s f4. The vz2694g entry also carries lessThan: 0 alongside its hash-based version entry; no human-readable firmware release or fixed release is provided.
  • Aopen: iAPLx-DE(TAA30 TEST) and iKBLMUx-DER(Volta Charging), with one affected firmware artifact identified for each model.
  • Dell: inspiron-15-3510-laptop, alienware-x17-r2-laptop, alienware-m17-r4-laptop, alienware-x14-r1-laptop, alienware-aurora-r15-amd-desktop, alienware-m17-r3-laptop, alienware-area51m-r2-laptop, alienware-x15-r1-laptop, inspiron-15-3521-laptop, alienware-aurora-r11-desktop, inspiron-15-3502-laptop, alienware-aurora-r13-desktop, xps-8950-desktop, alienware-aurora-r15-desktop, alienware-aurora-r14-desktop, alienware-aurora-r16-desktop, xps-8960-desktop, alienware-m15-r2-laptop, and inspiron-17-3782-laptop.

CERT/CC records Acer, Aopen, and Dell as having no vendor statement or fixed boundary in the information reviewed. Notices from Supermicro, Fujitsu, and GIGABYTE show that remediation depends on the vendor and firmware branch, but they do not establish a fixed release for the Acer, Aopen, or Dell models in this record.

Technical details

Affected UEFI firmware uses a hard-coded software-based Platform Key (PK) as the trust root for Secure Boot. The PK controls the trust chain involving the KEK, db, and dbx databases, where db determines which UEFI components may run and dbx contains forbidden signatures. An attacker who possesses the private key corresponding to the PK can create signatures accepted by firmware, causing arbitrary UEFI executables or firmware components to be trusted while Secure Boot is enabled. Technical research indicates that default test keys supplied by AMI were incorporated into some production firmware, while the UEFI verification process primarily checks keys in the local database and does not fully validate them against a root CA or extended attributes. The normalized record describes local reachability, high privileges, high attack complexity, and no user interaction. The method used to obtain the private key and the firmware-specific implementation details are not fully established.

Exploitability

The normalized record characterizes exploitation as local, requiring high privileges, high complexity, and no user interaction. The central precondition is possession of the private key corresponding to the misused PK. Binarly has publicly documented and reproduced a technical attack path on a device using a leaked test PK, showing that the Secure Boot trust chain can be undermined once these conditions are met. The record does not establish in-the-wild exploitation, and it does not identify a ransomware campaign associated with the issue.

Technical impact

  • An attacker with the corresponding PK private key can cause arbitrary UEFI code or firmware components to be accepted during boot, defeating the intended Secure Boot trust validation.
  • The technical outcome may affect system confidentiality, integrity, and availability, including the ability to maintain malicious code below the operating system.
  • The normalized record describes unchanged scope, local reachability, and a high-privilege precondition. The vulnerability alone does not establish how an attacker obtains initial access or the private key.
  • Devices outside the listed artifacts and models are not established by this record to be either affected or unaffected.

Business impact

  • Secure Boot may no longer ensure that only approved UEFI code runs during system startup.
  • An affected device could accept malicious code before the operating system loads, weakening operating-system-level controls and creating a risk of persistent platform compromise.
  • Potential consequences include loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but the record does not confirm a specific compromise or data loss event.
  • Remediation may require coordinated BIOS or firmware updates and replacement of trust databases, rather than simply enabling Secure Boot again.

Remediation

  1. Check each model and UEFI firmware with the official Acer, Aopen, or Dell support channel, then apply the firmware update intended for that exact model. The record marks patch_available: true, but it does not provide an exact fixed release for the affected models.
  2. If the firmware contains an untrusted PK, follow the vendor-supported process to replace the Platform Key with a new trusted key. The technical research states that affected devices should be treated as having lost trust and that KEK, db, and dbx may also need to be checked and replaced with databases containing trusted signatures and certificates.
  3. After updating, verify that the PK no longer contains DO NOT TRUST or DO NOT SHIP, and recheck KEK, db, and dbx. Do not treat an enabled Secure Boot state as sufficient evidence that the issue is resolved.
  4. If a model is unsupported or no confirmed fixed firmware is available, request model-specific guidance from the vendor. Do not assume that a fix for Supermicro, Fujitsu, GIGABYTE, or another product branch applies to Acer, Aopen, or Dell.
  5. After key replacement, review prior changes to the key databases and firmware under the organization’s incident-response process. The record does not provide a specific indicator of compromise or confirm that compromise occurred.

Detection

  1. Inventory Acer, Aopen, and Dell models in the environment together with their UEFI firmware versions or corresponding firmware identifiers, then compare them with the affected artifacts identified by the CNA or vendor.
  2. On Linux, inspect the UEFI PK variable with efi-readvar -v PK, then review the certificate subject and issuer fields. The strings DO NOT TRUST or DO NOT SHIP are indicators identified by Binarly for PKfail.
  3. On Windows, from an administrator PowerShell console, check the PK with [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((Get-SecureBootUEFI PK).bytes) -match "DO NOT TRUST|DO NOT SHIP".
  4. Separately verify the state of PK, KEK, db, and dbx after any firmware update or key replacement. A result that lacks these identifying strings is not sufficient to prove safety when the model or firmware has not been validated by the vendor.
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