Default JWT Secret Authentication Bypass in Gravitee API Management by Gravitee

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What is CVE-2020-37281?

CVE-2020-37281 is a vulnerability classified as Use of Default Cryptographic Key, affecting Gravitee API Management (affected versions: ≤ 4.12.22). This vulnerability is rated Critical, with a CVSS score of 9.2. Current sources do not report this vulnerability as exploited.

Overview

Original source data

Gravitee API Management through 4.12.22 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to impersonate any user by forging JWTs signed with the shipped default jwt.secret. Attackers knowing an existing user ID can sign an HS256 token with that subject and present it as a bearer token to the Management API, impersonating administrators to gain full platform control.

Affected products and scope

  • Gravitee API Management: semver versions from 0 through and including 4.12.22 are marked affected.
  • The important exposure condition is that the deployment continues to use the shipped default jwt.secret.
  • The record's default status is unaffected outside the explicitly listed version range. No later or parallel release branch is independently confirmed by the available evidence.
  • The record does not provide an exact fixed release.

Technical details

The affected component is the Gravitee Management API authentication path. The application configuration reads jwt.secret and passes it to TokenAuthenticationFilter; the shipped configuration contains a known default, and the implementation logs a warning that the default can be used to impersonate anyone. An attacker who can reach the Management API and knows an existing user ID can create a forged HS256 JWT with its subject set to that identity, then submit it as a bearer token. The server can consequently process the request as the selected user without valid credentials. The normalized record specifies that the network attack requires no prior privileges or user interaction, but characterizes attack complexity as high; the evidence does not document why. The available evidence does not establish whether every deployment mode in scope has identical behavior, and it does not identify an exact fixed release.

Exploitability

The flaw is remotely reachable through the Management API when that interface is accessible and the deployment still uses the shipped default jwt.secret. The attacker does not need prior authentication or user interaction, but needs an existing user ID and the ability to create a token compatible with the default secret. The normalized record characterizes attack complexity as high. The supplied record does not establish known exploitation and does not identify a public exploit; that is not proof that exploitation has never occurred.

Technical impact

  • Authentication and privilege: The flaw permits authentication bypass and impersonation of a legitimate user; selecting an administrator identity could extend the impact to full platform control.
  • Confidentiality: The attacker may access information available to the impersonated identity.
  • Integrity: The attacker may make unauthorized administrative changes through the Management API.
  • Availability: Unauthorized changes could disrupt operation of the API platform.
  • The evidence confirms platform-level consequences but does not establish host-level code execution or compromise outside the platform.

Business impact

  • Access: An attacker may take over the identity of a legitimate user, including an administrator, without a valid password.
  • Data and configuration: Administrator impersonation could enable unauthorized access to or modification of data and configuration managed by the platform.
  • Operations: Unauthorized Management API changes could affect platform integrity or availability.
  • The evidence describes possible platform takeover but does not establish a specific breach, victim, or business loss.

Remediation

  1. For Gravitee API Management deployments through and including 4.12.22, replace the shipped default jwt.secret in the APIM API component's gravitee.yml with a strong, deployment-specific secret.
  2. Apply a vendor-provided patch or release confirmed to address the issue. The record indicates that a patch is available but does not provide an exact fixed version, so do not assume that every later release branch is safe.
  3. Check every APIM API component serving the Management API to ensure that no instance still uses the default secret.
  4. Verify that the default value is absent from the active configuration and that startup logs no longer report use of the default JWT secret.

Detection

  1. Inventory Gravitee API Management versions and deployment types, then compare them with the affected scope in affected_summary.
  2. Inspect each APIM API component's gravitee.yml, especially the jwt.secret setting, and verify that the shipped default is not in use.
  3. Review startup logs from BasicSecurityConfigurerAdapter for the known messages You still use the default jwt secret. and This known secret can be used to impersonate anyone.
  4. As a precautionary check, review Management API authentication and audit logs for unexpected bearer-token sessions or administrative changes. This is generic monitoring rather than a confirmed IOC, and the absence of suspicious log entries does not prove that the system is safe.
Sources (11)
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