ZTE ZXHN F670 Information Exposure Through appviahttp

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Overview

Original source data

All versions up to V1.1.10P3T18 of ZTE ZXHN F670 product are impacted by information exposure vulnerability, which may allow an unauthenticated attacker to get the GPON SN information via appviahttp service.

Affected products and scope

  • The ZTE CNA identifies ZTE ZXHN F670 versions <= V1.1.10P3T18 as affected.
  • NVD CPE data represented in the reviewed source expresses firmware exposure with a before boundary at 1.1.10p3t18, creating a difference in boundary formatting.
  • Use the CNA wording for triage and verify the exact boundary with ZTE. No parallel affected branch or confirmed fixed release is supplied in the record.

Technical details

The vulnerability is classified as information exposure and affects the appviahttp service in ZTE ZXHN F670. The documented interaction is access to that service, through which an unauthenticated caller may obtain GPON SN information. The supplied attack characteristics require adjacent-network reachability, do not require credentials, and do not require user interaction; the record also characterizes the attack complexity as low. The public evidence does not identify the request path, parameter, response format, authorization defect, or whether the service is enabled by default. It also does not document a write primitive or a service-disruption mechanism, so broader integrity or availability effects remain unproven technical details even though the vendor assessment indicates those impacts are possible.

Exploitability

  • Reachability: The attack requires adjacent-network access and is not described as general Internet-wide remote access.
  • Authentication: No authentication is required.
  • User interaction: No user interaction is required.
  • Complexity: The record characterizes the attack complexity as low.
  • Known exploitation: The supplied record and reviewed authoritative content do not establish observed exploitation, a named campaign, or a public exploit.

Technical impact

The confirmed technical outcome is that an unauthenticated caller can obtain GPON SN information through appviahttp. This exposes a device-specific network identifier to an attacker with adjacent-network access. The record does not establish whether obtaining this information enables privilege escalation, persistence, device impersonation, configuration changes, or service disruption. The most certain organisational consequences are increased targetability and loss of confidentiality; integrity or availability effects require further vendor explanation and validation.

Business impact

The confirmed impact is loss of confidentiality for a device's GPON SN information. This information may help an attacker identify or target subscriber-premises equipment, but the supplied evidence does not establish impersonation, provisioning changes, traffic interception, or an outage. The vendor assessment indicates potentially broader integrity and availability consequences, yet the public technical description does not explain the mechanism for those outcomes. Organizations should treat exposed devices as requiring remediation or compensating isolation, especially where adjacent networks include untrusted users.

Remediation

  1. Contact ZTE or the device supplier for the vendor-confirmed firmware remediation for ZXHN F670, then apply the exact release they identify. The supplied record does not name a fixed release.
  2. Do not treat V1.1.10P3T18 as a fix, because the CNA affected boundary includes that version.
  3. Until remediation is confirmed, restrict the device's adjacent-network exposure and isolate it from untrusted segments where operationally feasible. This is a compensating precaution, not a vendor-confirmed fix.
  4. If update support cannot be verified, replace or retire the affected device.

Detection

  1. Inventory ZTE ZXHN F670 devices and record installed firmware, then compare each device with the affected version boundary in the CNA record.
  2. Determine whether appviahttp is enabled and reachable from adjacent networks without authentication. Use controlled validation only, and do not expose the service to untrusted networks during testing.
  3. Review available device, gateway, and network telemetry for unauthenticated access to appviahttp or responses containing GPON SN information. Treat this as a precautionary review because the record provides no confirmed log string or IOC.
  4. Prioritize devices that match the affected boundary for remediation or isolation. Lack of matching telemetry does not prove that a device is safe.
Sources (7)
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