Overview
Original source dataThe image signature algorithm in OpenStack Glance 11.0.0 allows remote attackers to bypass the signature verification process via a crafted image, which triggers an MD5 collision.
Affected products and scope
- OpenStack Glance 11.0.0 is confirmed affected; the OpenStack notice records the affected release as
=11.0.0and states that all Glance setups are affected. - Red Hat lists
openstack-glance,python-glance,python3-glance, or corresponding source components in Red Hat OpenStack Platform 8 (Liberty), 13 (Queens), 16.2, and 17.1 as known affected. The source component of Red Hat OpenStack Platform 18.0 is also listed as known affected. - Red Hat lists Glance components in Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenStack Platform 5 (Icehouse), 6 (Juno), and 7 (Kilo) as known not affected.
- The record and inspected sources do not provide an exact upstream fixed release. Do not infer that every release newer than 11.0.0 is fixed.
Technical details
The affected component is Glance's image signature verification algorithm. Glance computes the image's cryptographic signature with the MD5 hash function. An attacker-crafted image can produce an MD5 collision, causing verification to accept content different from the content that was signed and allowing the check to be bypassed. The OpenStack description says that a Glance backend operator may subvert verification, while the normalized record describes remote attackers, so the exact trust boundary is not fully reconciled. The available evidence does not identify an API endpoint, file path, implementation function, authentication requirement, or specific user-interaction condition. Authoritative records classify the issue as a cryptographic weakness corresponding to CWE-310 and CWE-327.
Exploitability
The record narrative describes remote attackers, but the OpenStack security notice describes a Glance backend operator as the actor who may subvert verification. Reachability and required privileges are therefore not established consistently. In either description, a crafted image must be introduced into or processed by Glance, making control of or influence over image processing a necessary condition. Authentication and user interaction are not clearly established by the description. The supplied evidence does not identify a named public exploit, exploitation campaign, or observed exploitation activity.
Technical impact
The primary technical outcome is loss of integrity for images verified by Glance. Altered image content may pass signature verification if it produces an MD5 collision. The consequence may reach workloads or users that trust the image, but the extent depends on image permissions, trust relationships, and distribution workflows in the affected cloud. The available evidence does not establish code execution, confidentiality loss, availability loss, or privilege escalation. Because the exploitation conditions are not fully resolved, impact assessment should focus on image-signing workflows and Glance backend operator permissions.
Business impact
A verification bypass can cause Glance to accept or distribute altered image content as if it had passed signature validation. This threatens the integrity of images used by cloud workloads and downstream consumers. If affected images are trusted or used to launch virtual machines, the operational impact may extend to workloads that consume those images. The available evidence does not establish consequences involving data disclosure or service availability.
Remediation
- Determine the exact Glance version, OpenStack or Red Hat platform branch, and image-signing packages in use.
- Prioritize moving away from Glance 11.0.0 and other confirmed affected branches to a vendor-confirmed fixed build or release. No exact upstream fixed release was confirmed by the inspected sources, so an arbitrary release newer than 11.0.0 should not be treated as safe.
- For Red Hat branches marked
no_fix_planned,out of support scope,will not fix, orfix deferred, follow a supported upgrade or platform migration path through Red Hat. - Until a confirmed fix is available, treat signatures from images processed through the affected verification path as insufficient proof of integrity. Where the environment permits, add an independent validation step before trusting or deploying those images. This is defense in depth, not a vendor-confirmed workaround.
- After remediation, consider revalidating or re-signing important images that were accepted through the vulnerable verification process.
Detection
- Inventory Glance versions and related packages in each cloud, including
openstack-glance,python-glance,python3-glance, and corresponding source packages. - Identify systems running OpenStack Glance 11.0.0 or deployments in the Red Hat branches listed as affected.
- Review configuration and operational workflows to identify where image signature verification is used and where images from sources that are not fully trusted enter Glance.
- Review image-import, signature-verification, and image-distribution logs for cases where an image was accepted despite signs of content alteration or inconsistency with a trusted source. This is precautionary monitoring, not a confirmed indicator.
- Use an independent integrity-checking process for important images before deployment. The absence of suspicious log events does not prove that a system is safe, and no specific IOC is established in the reviewed evidence.