Acoustic side channel enables RSA key extraction in GnuPG

Note: This data is for reference and cybersecurity research purposes only.CyStack advises users not to use this information for unlawful purposes.

Overview

Original source data

GnuPG 1.x before 1.4.16 generates RSA keys using sequences of introductions with certain patterns that introduce a side channel, which allows physically proximate attackers to extract RSA keys via a chosen-ciphertext attack and acoustic cryptanalysis during decryption. NOTE: applications are not typically expected to protect themselves from acoustic side-channel attacks, since this is arguably the responsibility of the physical device. Accordingly, issues of this type would not normally receive a CVE identifier. However, for this issue, the developer has specified a security policy in which GnuPG should offer side-channel resistance, and developer-specified security-policy violations are within the scope of CVE.

Affected products and scope

  • GnuPG: releases in the 1.x branch before 1.4.16 are affected. The normalized record also marks the supplied wildcard and the explicitly listed 1.0.x through 1.2.7 releases as affected.
  • GnuPG 1.4.16 is the upstream release identified as fixing the issue. The GnuPG advisory states that GnuPG 2.x is not affected.
  • Ubuntu gnupg: Ubuntu lists fixes for 13.10 at 1.4.14-1ubuntu2.1, 13.04 at 1.4.12-7ubuntu1.3, 12.10 at 1.4.11-3ubuntu4.4, 12.04 at 1.4.11-3ubuntu2.5, and 10.04 at 1.4.10-2ubuntu1.5.
  • Debian gnupg: Debian lists fixes for squeeze at 1.4.10-4+squeeze4, wheezy at 1.4.12-7+deb7u3, and sid at 1.4.15-2.
  • The status of other branches or package builds should not be inferred merely because one branch has a fix; verify the corresponding vendor advisory.

Technical details

The flaw is an acoustic side channel exposed while GnuPG performs RSA decryption. The record attributes the issue to patterns in RSA key generation and processing; the technical discussion further reports that the attack leveraged zero-padding of inputs to force modular reductions in GnuPG's RSA implementation.

  1. A physically proximate attacker places a sensor near the target and records acoustic emanations while RSA decryption is performed.
  2. The target processes ciphertexts selected or adapted by the attacker, such as in an automated decryption workflow.
  3. Adaptive analysis correlates the acoustic signal with internal RSA operations.
  4. Under the described conditions, the private key can be reconstructed bit by bit.

The fix uses RSA blinding during decryption and adds normalization of MPIs supplied to secret-key functions. The available evidence does not show that every decryption workflow or device is exploitable; the described scenario depends on physical access, device acoustics, and processing of attacker-influenced ciphertexts.

Exploitability

This is an attack requiring local physical proximity, not a network-only remote attack. The target must perform RSA decryption on ciphertexts selected by the attacker, and the attacker must be able to collect acoustic emanations that are useful for analysis.

  • Authentication: The supplied record does not identify an authentication requirement.
  • User interaction: Direct user interaction may not be required when the target performs unattended decryption.
  • Complexity: The supplied assessment characterizes attack complexity as low, although the practical scenario still requires physical proximity, a sensor, and a decryption workflow that processes attacker-influenced ciphertexts.
  • Exploitation status: The evidence establishes a researched attack and describes a possible scenario, but does not establish exploitation of a particular deployment, a named campaign, or a public exploit.

Technical impact

The flaw can expose RSA private keys through acoustic side-channel analysis during decryption. Recovery of the private key can break the confidentiality of data encrypted for that key and may undermine the trustworthiness of signatures or authentication that use it.

The impact requires several conditions: physical proximity to the device, useful acoustic measurements, and the ability to cause the target to process chosen ciphertexts. The record does not describe an availability impact or direct modification of data. The available evidence does not identify a particular deployment that was compromised.

Business impact

The primary consequence is potential exposure of RSA private keys used by GnuPG. If a key is recovered, an attacker could decrypt data protected for that key and could potentially undermine signatures or authentication that depend on it; these are consequences of key compromise, not separately demonstrated actions in the record.

Risk is concentrated in legacy systems that process attacker-influenced ciphertexts while the device can be reached by an acoustic sensor. No direct data modification or availability impact is described. If a long-lived key was used on an affected system in an observable environment, the organization should assess key replacement as a precautionary measure.

Remediation

  1. Upgrade GnuPG 1.x to GnuPG 1.4.16, the upstream release confirmed to fix the issue. If migration is feasible, the GnuPG advisory states that GnuPG 2.x is not affected.
  2. On Ubuntu, apply the branch-specific package update: 13.10 1.4.14-1ubuntu2.1, 13.04 1.4.12-7ubuntu1.3, 12.10 1.4.11-3ubuntu4.4, 12.04 1.4.11-3ubuntu2.5, or 10.04 1.4.10-2ubuntu1.5.
  3. On Debian, apply the corresponding update: squeeze 1.4.10-4+squeeze4, wheezy 1.4.12-7+deb7u3, or sid 1.4.15-2.
  4. If an affected system processed RSA private keys in an environment where acoustic observation was possible, assess whether to replace those keys and review data or signatures that depend on them. This is precautionary follow-up based on possible key exposure, not a finding that compromise occurred.
  5. Before updating, reduce the described attack preconditions by limiting unattended decryption of ciphertexts supplied by external sources and restricting physical access to the device. These measures reduce exposure temporarily and do not replace the security update.

Detection

  • Inventory installed GnuPG and package versions to identify deployments in the affected release range. Do not rely only on the package name, because distributors can backport fixes into a different package version.
  • Identify systems that use GnuPG for RSA decryption of incoming email, files, or other data from untrusted sources, especially unattended or opportunistic decryption workflows.
  • Assess physical and acoustic exposure for those systems, including device placement, the surrounding environment, and whether a sensor could be positioned nearby.
  • Review the use of long-lived RSA private keys on systems that ran an affected build. This is a risk-assessment step, not evidence that a key was exposed.
  • The available evidence does not name a specific log event, IOC, or software-only indicator for this attack. Absence of unusual log activity therefore does not prove that a system is safe.
Sources (34)
Learn more

Run an in-depth assessment with complete web risk management

CyStack VulnScan continuously discovers assets, validates vulnerabilities, and helps security teams prioritize remediation across the organization.